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Free Will and Subject
John Shand
The Open University, UK
Abstract.  Traditionally formulated, the problem of free will cannot be solved. We may nevertheless be
justifiably confident that we have free will. The traditional formulation makes a solution impossible by
juxtaposing contradictory objective and subjective accounts of whether there is free will, between which
accounts there is no third way to choose. However, the objective stance inherently denies the conditions
under which free will is possible, namely that there are subjects, and is thus question-begging. It gives us
no good reason for  our not having free will  without our also accepting that  there are no subjects.  As
subjects we may not deny that there are subjects, and that as subjects we have good reason, through our
experience of free will, to hold that we have free will. The problem of free will is a footnote to how there
may be subjects. In order to understand what free will is we need to look at how it is experienced, that is, at
the phenomenology of free will.
1.
The problem of free will as traditionally formulated cannot be solved. Nevertheless, we
still have good reason to think that we have free will and no good reason for thinking that
we  do not  have  free  will.  As  traditionally  formulated,  the  possibility  of  free  will  is
necessarily preemptively denied just by an objective stance being adopted, a stance that
often suggests that it  may also give a complete account of the universe.  However, to
adopt such a stance is to deny the very possibility of the condition under which free will
makes  sense,  namely  that  there  are  subjects,  and  the  objective  stance  is  therefore
question-begging  with  regard  to  free  will.  There  is  no  good  reason,  other  than  the
question-begging objective stance, to deny the veridicality of the experience of free will
that subjects have. Further, we cannot as subjects deny the existence of subjects. The
mystery, if there is one, is therefore not that there is free will, rather it is that there are
subjects at  all.  The objective stance denies the existence of free will  by denying the
existence of subjects, since subjects are a condition for free will. This of course leaves a
problem, but it is no longer the problem of free will, but rather the fundamental problem
of there being subjects at all, as a complete objective account of the universe would in the
end make no mention of them or their experiences, and yet supposedly leave nothing
unexplained. This is not a problem that can be solved here. However, the objective stance
as a complete account of the universe comes up starkly against the difficulty of denying
that there are subjects, a denial made impossible, one might argue, by being a subject.
Once subjects are admitted, there is, it is argued, no special problem of free will, any
more than there is for other features of the experience of subjects. For subjects, free will
is  a  clear  reality.  We  might  turn  out  to  be  mistaken  about  some  of  our  subjective
experiences, if not in their appearance then in what we infer from them. But that general
observation is a poor reason to think that we do not have free will, especially when the
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experience of free will is so pervasive of our experience and so essentially connected to
our being subjects. As subjects, it is impossible, one might claim, to assert that there are
no subjects  as near to a concrete, self-refuting claim about existence as one might get 
so therefore there are some subjects1 in the universe. This, of course, has a Cartesian ring
to it. But there is no commitment in this paper to dualism, nor is it entailed. The point is
not to put forward a solution to the problem of how subjects are possible in a universe
accounted for objectively. Rather, it is to shift the problem of free will to that problem,
and leave that unresolved, while asserting that the existence of subjects is certain and free
will is a feature of subjects and can only be understood as a feature of subjects. To try to
understand how free will is possible on an objective account of the universe is a waste of
time; the understanding of free will comes from our experience as subjects; how there can
be subjects is another matter altogether; but it is certainly not open to the kind of doubt
that  supposedly  applies  to  the  existence  of  free  will.  As  subjects  it  is  clear  that  we
experience free will and that therefore there is free will. The problem of free will is a
footnote to how there may be subjects.
There  are  those  who  do  indeed  objectively  deny  the  existence  of  subjects.
Consciousness is an illusion, on this view. This, however, is a topic of another paper. It is
a position that should be taken seriously.2 But it need not be addressed here, as the denial
that there is free will usually goes along with an affirmation of there being subjects in an
attempt to make free will compatible with subjecthood. For if there are no subjects it is
hard to see why the issue of free will should arise at all. One may only say here that if
such  a  view is  to  be  accepted,  then  one  would  have  to  be  more  convinced  by the
argument for it than by the immediate evidence of one’s own subjectivity. In this sense, a
denial that there are subjects might be seen as a kind of doomsday-weapon solution to the
problem of free will.
The question of what free will is is a further matter. It will be looked at towards
the  end  of  the  paper.  In  fact,  what  free  will  is  is  properly  understood  through  the
phenomenology of the experience of free will. It cannot be understood by some external
view, but only from, as it were, the inside, as subjects. We think and act with and by free
will, and that is inseparable from our awareness of ourselves as the kind of subjects we
are   more widely, one might say, inseparable from our understanding of ourselves as
persons. We do not have to give up our reason for believing in free will until we are given
a reason for not believing that there are subjects, and it is hard to see how that could
happen.
2.
Some people may argue that the manoeuvre offered here to tackle the problem of free
will is unnecessary, as there are other ways to solve the problem. Few have, however,
ever been convinced by them, and whatever one thinks about other approaches, there is
1 That is to say, at least one.  
2 One of the chief and most eloquent proponents here is  (Humphrey:  2006) and (Humphrey:
2012).  In  the  latter  work  Humphrey  says  consciousness  is  an  illusion,  a  ‘fiction  of  the  impossible’
(Humphrey: 2012, p. 204). In reviewing the book Keith Frankish goes as far as to say ‘I think such a
position is the only coherent one for a physicalist’ (Frankish: 2014, pp. 338-340). This is certainly taking
the bull by the horns. Fine  but if one takes that step, then it’s hard to see how there could even be an issue
for free will. See also, (Shand: 2006) review of (Humphrey: 2006)
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no reason not to take a new line on the issue. Free will certainly seems an archetypal
perennial  philosophical  problem  by  any  measure;  solving  the  problem  is  a  kind  of
philosopher’s  in-joke;  it  is  one  of  those  problems  on  which  there  seems  to  be  little
discernible progress made, one that we assume in a way no-one is ever going to solve.
There  is  therefore  no  need  to  rehearse  in  detail  the  arguments  about  free  will  as
traditionally formulated, as the position here avoids that approach, and frankly concedes
that,  approached  traditionally,  the  problem  is  insoluble   and  not  accidentally,  but
necessarily, so. Indeed this last observation gives form and direction to the new approach.
Once the new approach is taken and followed through, a solution is found, if a solution
may amount to our having a good reason for thinking we have free will and no good
reason for thinking that we do not. It leaves, as has been said, another claim and problem,
no longer the claim or problem of there being free will, but rather that of there being
subjects and how there may be subjects; a problem just as hard to solve, but a claim
vastly harder to deny. As a problem it is far more profound and unavoidable, for we are as
subjects, as much as anything seems undeniable, subjects. Indeed, as a subject, to deny
that one is a subject would be performatively self-refuting. 
We may summarise the array of attempts to deal with the problem of free will as
traditionally formulated in the following way. 
Compatibilists  determinism is true, but we are free.
 compatibilist externalism – determinism is true, but we
     are free if we are unconstrained by external causes.
 compatibilist internalism – determinism is true, but we
     are free because we act according to a certain kind of
     internal cause.
 compatibilist rationalism – determinism is true, but we
     are free because we act according to the dictates of 
     reason.
            
Incompatibilists  determinism is true and we are not free, or determinism is false
  and we are free.
 incompatibilist determinism – determinism is true, and
     we are not free.
 incompatibilist libertarianism – determinism is false,
     and we are free.
Compatibilists will argue that the contradictory opposition of the objective and subjective
stances is only apparent. I shall not rehearse all the well-known arguments for and against
this view, but only say that the arguments for compatibilism have far from convinced
everyone.  One might  also  add  that  the  general  direction  of  compatibilism putatively
solving the  free  will  problem involves  its  being  true  to  the  objective  account  of  the
universe, but paying the price on the free will side by leaving something that few still
believe to be truly free will. We have, at best, ‘free will’  and it is as though we need
explaining what we really meant by it all along. On the other hand, incompatibilists of a
liberal complexion go the other way by leaving us with something that looks very much
like what we might want if we were truly to say there is free will, but at the expense of
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accepting a view of the universe so out of line with the prevailing one delivered by a
comprehensive objective stance that it struggles for plausibility.
Symptomatic of the wrongness of the traditional approach to the problem of free
will is the fact that the key issue antagonistic to free will attached to the objective stance,
namely determinism, is equally antagonistic whether asserted or denied. This might alert
one to thinking that one is not starting in the right place.   
The view presented here agrees with the hard view of incompatibilists as to what
the objective stance is, but does not give up on something that most people might still
identify  as  free  will.  It  also  agrees  with  the  incompatibilist  liberal  that  the  view of
freedom cannot be that presented by the compatibilist,  but it is not committed to any
‘obscure and panicky metaphysics’3 brought on by allowing for free will proper.
Finally,  insofar  as  other  approaches  are  concerned,  there  is  a  form  of
philosophical quietism with respect to free will.4 This view amounts to saying that the
answer to the question of whether determinism is true or not is irrelevant to answering the
question of whether there is free will or not, which is explained rather by our having
‘reactive-attitudes’5 to other creatures, in particular, to fellow human beings. These, and
the ensuing attribution of free will, are something we are completely unable to give up,
nor, even if we could do so, would we want to. The latter claim is a normative matter of
value,  not of fact,  making mere facts  about determinism shown up as irrelevant.  The
position here, however, unlike this form of philosophical quietism, does not reject there
being  a  metaphysical  problem  requiring  a  solution,  but  rather  sees  the  crucial
metaphysical  problem  as  that  of  the  existence  of  subjects  given  a  putatively
comprehensive objective stance, not the lesser one of the existence of free will. There is
no pretence here to solve that problem, that of there being subjects, for which it would
seem an objective account of the universe has no place. The point here is to show that
that is the real problem, not that of free will, and that given our experience as subjects, we
have a good justification for thinking we have free will. Moreover, the understanding of
free will necessarily has to be one for subjects, as a feature of being a subject. Take an
objective stance, and free will evaporates. Free will is a subjective matter   it literally
makes no sense except as something as experienced by a subject.
The argument here takes on the hardest case in tackling the free will problem. It
neither abandons the objective stance, nor bends free will out of shape to fit it. It involves
standing back from the traditional approach, while using what is wrong with it to launch a
new answer to the problem.
3.
The change entailed by the absence of free will in our thinking about the world, our place
in it, our dealings with other people, and the language we use in these contexts, would be
radical and colossal.6 Yet the problem as traditionally formulated seems both intransigent
3 (Strawson: 1962, p. 25)
4 (Strawson: 1962)
5 (Strawson: 1962)
6 Sir Isaiah Berlin states eloquently what would be involved in our abandoning the idea that
persons have free will. In fact, his thinking so is a consequence of his thinking determinism true. But the
colossal change involved in how we think is captured in any case. (Berlin: 1969, p. 113).
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and yet not one we can simply set aside. While seemingly insoluble, it still continues to
bother us. 
The ground of both these matters is that we are subjects and cannot escape some
determinants of our worldview being that of subjects. We simply cannot conceive of our
being subjects of the sort we are, nor can we exist as such subjects, and not think that we
are capable of free will, no matter how limited in scope it may be.7 The argument for this
is one we might characterise as trying out the alternative  being a subject and from the
inside conceiving of ourselves as having no free will.  The challenge is  to  try this  as
something one might actually live out as a subject. The contention is that we cannot; it is
impossible. It amounts to a performative contradiction. The act of applying to ourselves
as subjects this stricture of denial is itself a denial of the denial that we have free will, and
so affirms that we have free will. We can only think of such free choice as eliminated
along with our ceasing to exist as subjects.8 This is not the subject as viewed objectively
from the outside, as it were, but rather as viewed from the inside as a subject. We might
conceivably bracket off free will from being a subject in the case of others  although the
process would be deeply contrived and lacking in conviction, but would perhaps involve
treating others as deceptive machines or zombies  but in our own case we cannot put a
division between ourselves as subjects and our thinking and acting with free will.
So, there is at least one entity about which we can say that it is inconceivable that
it does not have free will. There is no need to get deeply into the problem of other minds
at this point  unless one embraces the incredible theory of free will solipsism  for it to
be plausibly claimed that there are indeed many subjects, and those that there are have
free will. All that needs to be said is that the problem of other minds may be a problem in
itself, but it is not a special problem for the issue that of free will.
By ‘subject’ here is meant that which is involved in having a view from a certain
standpoint interlaced with particular immanent sensibilities. The world as viewed, looked
out upon, through our own eyes,  from our perspective. From this position of being a
subject, the fact of free will looks as certain as any belief can be; no-one could seriously
even suspend it, let alone reject it wholesale, as they think and act in their lives and have
their being-in-the-world.
But  there’s  the  rub.  Whereas  from  a  subjective  point  of  view  free  will  is
something we cannot help thinking is true  something that we cannot give up  from an
objective point of view it looks impossible that it could be true. The impossibility of a
truth being false runs right up against the impossibility of the truth being true. This is the
usual way of things when the truth about free will is judged, respectively, subjectively
and  objectively,  or  so  it  seems.  This  approach,  however,  it  will  be  argued,  hides  an
assumption corresponding to a far deeper matter about the nature of reality. This makes
the traditional way of approaching the problem misconceived. It misunderstands both the
problem and the nature of free will. The awareness of this, and the understanding of why
it is misconceived, points to a new way of thinking about the problem of free will. In this
7 cf (Sartre: 1989, pp. 28-29)
8 ‘Subject’ here  is  not  synonymous  with ‘person’,  the  latter  in  its  honorific  sense.  To  avoid
confusion and a possible objection, it  is  worth pointing out that  one may cease to be a subject  while
remaining on other grounds a person. Someone in a coma has perhaps ceased to be a subject, but they have
not arguably ceased to be a person, and should have some, at least, of the rights of a person. One may be a
person without being a subject, but one cannot be a human subject and not be a person.
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way it ceases to be a problem in itself   rather it should be understood in relation to a
much larger problem by which free will would stand or fall. But that problem, how there
can be subjects, has attached to it nothing like the scepticism that attaches to the existence
of free will. There may be some people who happily accept the idea that there is no free
will  even though they think and act quite contrary to that idea, and the inconsistency of
their holding the idea is thus shown up  but there are not many who equally cheerfully
embrace the idea that they are not subjects   indeed it is hard to know what that could
possibly mean. That one is a subject is not brought into doubt in the same way that free
will is by an objective conception of the universe, despite its being, if anything, an even
more  acute  problem and  mystery.  There  are  no  corresponding  swaths  of  pessimistic
incompatibilists about subjecthood: those who heartily embrace  as subjects  the idea
that if the objective conception of the universe is true and complete as an account, then
there are no subjects. That, in short, they must be deluded that they are subjects.    
From an objective point of view there seems to be no place for free will in the
world, pace compatibilism. Let us take a blunt, straightforward, approach to this. Nothing
hangs on the example here, rather, it is just the case of it being close to home, so to speak.
Suppose you take the top of someone’s head off. All you see are causal deterministic
brain events, each of which inevitably leads to the next. It does what it does in accord
with accepted scientific laws. It looks in kind like any other object in the universe. It
looks no different in kind from what might be observed inside a star or a watch. Yet from
a  subjective  point  of  view,  that  of  the  subject  identified  with  the  very same  brain9,
perhaps even the one just viewed and accounted for objectively, that one is capable of
free  choice  looks  irresistible  and  certain.  Looking  at  the  brain,  free  choice  looks
impossible. There seems no more reason to attribute free will to that object than to any
other object in the universe. The only reason we do so, of course, is that this object can
also be a subject, indeed we might be that very subject. There would be no glimmer of a
reason to suppose free will were taking place except for the fact, an indisputable fact, that
this object is also a subject: that it has awareness, consciousness, self-consciousness, has
a view of the universe, that there is something it is like to be it. Without there being
subjects, without being a subject, the idea of free will would never occur to anyone  in
fact, in that case there would be no-one for the idea to occur to. Free will is dependent
both as idea, so that that it  may be thought that there is free will,  and moreover as a
reality such that there is free will, on there being subjects.
It is indeed odd that it is only in a tiny part of the universe  somewhere around
the vicinity of the human brain, certainly having as its locus the human body  that the
problem of the subject, and thence of free will, seems to arise at all. It does not even
come up as a consideration for anything else in the entire universe from the largest to the
smallest objects. Just this incredibly tiny part of it. This might lead one to think that some
kind of catastrophic mistake has been made in thinking that different explanations are
required here that are not required, as far as we know, anywhere else in the universe.
Even if intelligent life were found elsewhere, it would hardly make much difference to
the vanishing, minute occurrence of subjects. So maybe the simple answer is, in the end,
that there are no subjects at all, and the complete objective explanation of the universe,
9 Just supposing crudely one may approximately do this, that is, identify a subject with a brain  but, in 
fact, nothing hangs on supposing otherwise, as simply other objectively accounted for processes would be 
involved.
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unmentioning of subjects or the quality and structure of their experiences as experienced
 their phenomenology  is sufficient as an explanation of everything. Such a line would
be at least moderately tempting were we not subjects ourselves. As we are subjects, it is
hard to see how it could be followed with any conviction. It is difficult, indeed, to see
how any such explanation could take place without subjects themselves providing it.
It is for this reason that we are incapable of laying the question of free will to rest.
We know for certain, or rather, we feel we know for certain, that we are capable of free
will,  so  we think  there  must  be  an  answer  to  how this  is  possible  regardless  of  the
apparent objective facts about the world, which seem to show that it is impossible. There
would be no motivation to try so hard to solve the problem of free will were we not
subjects, and were there not a conceptual link between our being subjects and our having
free will that makes the separation of the two impossible.
The opposition of certainty (that we have free will) and mystery (how it can be
possible)  is  the core of the free will  problem, and takes us deeper than the free will
problem itself as traditionally formulated. The real mystery is not how there can be free
will in a causally deterministic world, but how there can be subjects at all. For, again,
looking inside someone’s head, you don’t find a subject, but rather a series of objective
causally related events. Yet, that very same entity is ineluctably a subject if it happens to
be your brain. If there were no subjects there would be no problem of free will, and if
there were no free will there would be no subjects  not subjects like us at any rate. And
we know there are subjects like us.
4.
The reason free will remains a problem is that the conditions under which a solution may
appear, that there either is or is not free will, depend upon whether the world is viewed
subjectively  or  objectively.  It  depends  from  which  of  these  we  are  drawing  our
explanation  or  account  of  what  is  the  case.  How one views  the  problem entails  the
solutions,  solutions  that  turn  out  to  be  mutually  contradictory.  In  trying  to  solve  the
problem we ping-pong futilely from one position to the other and back again, or are held
in a kind of indecisive limbo between the two   although it is not a limbo-position in
which anyone is actually able to live beyond a theoretical nod towards it.
It might be said that in that case we should simply dismiss the subjective stance as
not really telling us how the world is. But from what point of view would this dismissal
receive its warrant? From the subjective stance there are no grounds for doing so, and
from an objective stance there are no grounds for holding that subjects exist, ruling out
free will as a matter of course. Taking the objective stance in itself determines that the
answer to whether there is free will will be negative, as facts gathered objectively deny
the existence of the conditions under which free will makes sense and is perceived as
occurring, namely that of the subject. The conclusion one comes to, as to whether there
are  subjects  and whether  there  is  free will,  is  itself  determined by which  stance  one
adopts. To reject the subjective stance on the basis of the objective one would therefore
be to commit the fallacy of petitio principii, for it would be to assume that the subjective
stance does not give a true picture of the world  it cannot give a true (or false) picture of
the  world  because  there  is  no  such  subjective  stance  from which  the  world  can  be
pictured at  all.  But  one  cannot,  without  begging the question,  use  the  facts  gathered
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through one set of conditions to deny other putative facts gathered through another set of
conditions, when the assumption of the first set is that the second set of conditions for
gathering such facts is impossible. The objective facts are by their nature not subjective
facts, and it would be to beg the question to use the objective facts to demonstrate that
there are no subjective facts, as talk of objective facts alone already assumes that there
are no subjects or subjective facts. A step toward a solution of the free will problem is to
grasp that the meaning of free will is given to us subjectively, in our experience.
One way of getting around this might be to view things from a third overarching
stance which could act as an arbiter, a stance neither subjective nor objective. But there is
no such stance. We either view the world objectively or subjectively; there is no third
position that could adjudicate as to which stance is the correct one for getting an accurate
picture of reality. Thus there is no way out of the impasse to solve the free will problem
as traditionally posed, and it is disingenuous to pick one of the stances to provide an
answer,  as each stance already assumes,  in taking up the very stance itself,  what  the
answer is. There is therefore no way of, say, giving one stance more weight than the
other; comparatively weighing them cannot come up. The facts gathered from within the
objective or the subjective stance cannot be used to determine which stance one ought to
adopt to determine the facts accurately, or which of the stances may accurately determine
the facts.
It might be said that as we are mistaken about many things that appear to us in a
certain way, we might be mistaken that we have free will. But the experience of free will
as a subject is not a separable feature of the subject  such that one might acknowledge a
visual illusion. Rather, free will is part of the fabric of being a subject. To be a subject is
to have free will; to have free will is to be a subject. It might be suggested that the final
claim is too strong, but nothing is gained against the argument here by limiting free will
as a necessary condition to the particular kind of subject we are. 
A summary of the argument so far might be given as follows.
Schema
_________________________________
            views of the world
                                                                                                            
                              objective stance (conception)               subjective stance (conception)
                                                                                                            
                        
                                        no subjects                                                  subjects
                                      (necessarily)                                              (undeniably)
                                                                                                               
                                        no free will                                                    free will
                     (subject a necessary                                 (subjects know this 
                                    condition for free will)                             undeniably from experience)
                                                                                                             l
                                                    no third-stance to adjudicate between l
                                                    the objective and subjective stances l
9
l
                                                                                 l 
                                                        traditionally formulated the free will l
                                                        problem is necessarily insoluble l
        l
                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                      No good reason to deny that
                                                                                      we have free will unless we deny
                                                                                      the existence of subjects, and good           
                                                                                      reason to think that we have
                                                                                      free will as subjects.
In short, as has been said, we have no good reason for thinking we do not have free will 
the proffered reason is question-begging  and we have good reasons from the nature and
experience of being a subject  which we cannot but be certain that we are  for thinking
that we have free will.
5.
Ineluctably and incorrigibly we believe we have free will even while we act to study the
world objectively. Not for one moment does the neurologist as he studies the chemical
and electrical goings-on in a live brain, perhaps even his own brain, consider that he lacks
free will; he lives it every moment even while the examination of the brain takes place.
Indeed, his act of studying and of understanding is itself a manifestation of free will that
would be impossible without it. This is because the act is guided by normative standards
and constraints.10 The subjective stance is required for there to be an understanding of the
world.11 This  is  not  a  claim  of  subjectivism,  but  rather  that  there  are  subjects  is  a
necessary condition for there being any comprehension of the world at all.12 There cannot
be a view of the world if there is nowhere the view can be from. To have a view of the
world is to have a view that may be judged normatively  it can be correct or incorrect, it
can be mistaken or not, it can be true or false, well supported by evidence or not, it may
be valuable or not. No such considerations apply to a universe devoid of subjects. No star
or atom is ever any of the things just listed. Things just, have happened, happen, or will
happen  normative considerations have no place in talking about such a universe.
To live without free will would be to live without normativity, which would in
turn to not be a subject at all. We cannot not be subjects and yet continue to exist  what
we are is subjects  we cannot continue to be as subjects and exist as something else 
once we cease to be subjects, we cease to exist. Crudely, this is called death.
10 A point well made by (Hampton: 1998, esp. pp. 39-40). cf (Nagel: 1986).
11 It  is  worth  looking  on  these  matters  at  (Lucas:  1993).  ‘It  is  a  presupposition  of  thought,
something like Descartes’  Cogito, ergo sum.  I  cannot think, except on the supposition that I  exist: we
cannot argue, except on the supposition that we are rational, and not just automata.’ (Lucas: 1993, p. 30).
12 In fact, I have argued in a paper elsewhere that such subjects specifically have to be limited in
some determinate manner or other, and that this condition may be met when the way they are in the world
is contingent and they are embodied, as otherwise the concepts required for any thought and understanding
do not arise  they are not possible at all. (Shand: 2009).
10
It should be noted clearly what is not being said here. The argument is not that of
a certain species of problem dissolvers, as outlined above, whereby the question of free
will may be settled because we cannot conceive of living our lives thinking we and others
are not capable of it, and that therefore for that reason the facts about determinism are
irrelevant. This is true  that a belief in our free will is not something we seem to be able
to give up, nor would we perhaps want to  but it is not the ground of the view here that
no objective fact  can upset  the belief  in  free will.  It  is  not  just  a  brute  fact  that  the
objective facts  about the truth or falsity of determinism cannot dislodge the belief  or
attitude that we have free will.  Nor is the argument here the second-defence one of a
particular sort of dissolver that the question of free will is a matter of adoption or not,
based on the value attached to it, and as such facts are irrelevant.13 Rather, the argument
here is that it is a conceptual truth that the objective facts are rationally invalid in respect
of determining whether there is free will or not, because the objective stance from which
they are gathered already assumes the answer, namely that free will is impossible. The
objective stance involved the denial of the existence of subjects  or, what amounts to the
same things, their superfluity in a complete explanation of the universe   and free will
necessarily  attaches  to  there  being  subjects,  so there  cannot  be  free  will.  Objectivity
intrinsically assumes there is no free will, and so the facts gathered from the objective
stance cannot be used to demonstrate that there is no free will. To suppose otherwise is
tantamount to the circular assertion that facts gathered according to the objective stance
show that the facts gathered according to the objective stance show that the objective
stance is the only valid one, and as opposed to those gathered from the point of view of
the subject, so that a subjective stance may according to the objective stance be, along
with  its  alleged facts,  summarily dismissed.  One cannot  use objectivity to  show that
subjectivity itself is false. One cannot use the facts derived from one stance, which imply
that another stance is impossible or worthless, to show that the other stance is impossible
or worthless, when the very taking up of the original stances necessarily assumes that to
be so. The only two positions for inquiring into whether there is free will prejudge, in
their mode of inquiry, the answer to the question of whether there is free will, and there is
no further way to determine without circularity which mode of inquiry should rationally
be followed.
We are left, so long as our own subjectivity exists, with the certainty that, by and
large, we are capable of free choice. Sometimes this belief may have to be modified when
we feel compelled by circumstances to act in a certain way  perhaps we are drug-addled
or schizophrenic  but this reflective modification, the introduction of caveats, is against
the background, and indeed presupposes, that we as subjects are conducting our lives
operated according to choice. We may exaggerate its extent, and even self-deceptively
hide from ourselves our unconsidered propelling motivations, but we cannot deny that
there are choices that we make and have to make.
The  result  of  this  may  be  a  different  kind  of  quietism  with  respect  to  the
traditional free will  problem as a  problem, as the answer to whether  free will  exists,
whether we can exercise free choice, depends on whether we believe there are subjects or
13 Thus, even if we could think differently, this would leave open the question of whether we
should  and as a matter of value, the facts about the world, in particular the facts about determinism, are
irrelevant. But this is a line of thought that has no weight either way for the argument here presented, so I
leave it undiscussed.
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not  but it also points beyond to a solution. As subjects it is a most impossible thing for
us to believe as false that we have free will. But there are no conditions under which we
could gather the facts to answer the question of whether there are subjects and whether
there is free will that would not predetermine the answer in the very act of gathering them
according to one set of conditions rather than the other; as there is no way to decide
rationally which conditions the facts should be gathered under, the traditional problem is
insoluble. The traditional problem of free will may be laid to rest. There is no point of
view from which the matter may be settled, except if one utterly denies the existence of
subjects; but there are no grounds for this, and as subjects it is conceptually impossible
for us to entertain such a denial. Entertaining it would deny the denial. As subjects we
cannot believe it to be false that there are subjects or believe that we have no free will.
We might perhaps be content with that. However, the point is not merely that this is a
brute fact, although it is, but that it is a conceptual truth both that the traditional problem
of free will cannot be settled  because no stance is available that does not presuppose the
answer through the mere taking up of that stance  and that the stance from which there
is, with ineluctable certainty, free will, that is to say the subjective stance, is the stance
within which we necessarily exist.
Furthermore, we may nevertheless be rationally justified, to the point of certainty,
in our belief that we have free will, since we cannot help but inhabit, so long as we exist
as subjects, the stance from which the facts show overwhelmingly that we have it, and
this belief may not, and not just cannot (although that is true too), be undermined by other
facts  gathered  from  the  objective  stance.  This  is  because  such  facts  are  rationally
disallowed from contributing to an answer by virtue of being gathered from a stance that
necessarily  begs  the  question  as  to  whether  there  is  free  will  through  denying  the
existence of subjects, which are the condition for free will. Thus, I argue two things: the
traditional problem of free will is resolved, since there is no point is trying to solve it, and
yet there can be no rational justification for denying that we have free will, indeed there
are good rational reasons for thinking we do have free will.
6.
It remains to say what this free will is that we seem to have and also value. This is an
important  matter,  and  has  so  far  been  left  dangling.  Nor  has  it  ever  been  closely
addressed, as it was thought that an account of free will would emerge from a solution to
the problem of free will as traditionally formulated. But if the argument here is correct,
then this is a futile hope as it is not going to ever happen. There must be a different way
of coming to understand what free will is.
In  order  to  say  what  free  will  is  we  have  to  look  at  it  as  it  is  subjectively
experienced. We have to take seriously the phenomenology of free will and of associated
free thought and action. In short, what it is like to think and act, to choose what to do in
both  our  thoughts  and  bodily  behaviour   a  picture  of  free  will  from the  inside  as
subjects. There is a history of coming up with an account of free will that in some way is
supposed to be the consequence of a putative solution to the problem of free will  as
traditionally formulated. Thus, it is said that we are free only when we are rational, or
free involving some negative caveat, such as that we are not constrained in some manner
or compelled by some irresistible desire or force. Characteristic of such accounts of free
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will is that the more easily they fit with the objective conception of reality, the less they
look like what people mean when they talk about free will, or about acting and thinking
freely, with free choice. But free will is such a central part of people’s lives and of what it
is  for them to be subjects at  all,  that  it  is  extraordinary that  it  should be considered
reasonable or required that they have to be told when it is occurring and when not, and
told what is going on in such occurrences; in short, that they do not really know when
they are acting or thinking with free will, that is to say, when they are making a free
choice in what they think or do. One might have to be told about the full physiological
details of the mechanism involved when one is walking, thinking about the value of , or
experiencing red. One hardly needs to be told what walking ‘really is’ so that one can
know when one is doing it or not. Indeed, being told such a thing hardly makes sense.
The same applies to knowing when one is thinking about , or knowing that one is seeing
red. We know what these things are from certain features of our experience. We might be
mistaken  in  specific  instances,  but  objective  considerations  are  of  no  relevance  in
determining what they are, and such instances are against the background of our usually
having a sound view of such matters, just as fake currency only makes sense against the
background of genuine currency.14
The usual approach to what free will is is not only simplistic and tinged with the
felt  need  for  objectivity,  it  also  neglects  what  is  true  to  the  phenomenology of  our
experience of free choice. The phenomenology of free will presents the core of what free
will  is because free will is necessarily experienced as something occurring to a subject.
To try to present what free will is just from the outside, as it were, will necessarily lead to
an unsatisfactory account, and misunderstands free will, because it removes the subject
that is necessary for there to be free will at all and is a required component of all acts of
free will. To remove the subject in giving an account of what free will is is doomed to
failure,  as  free  will  only makes  full  sense  from the  subjective  stance  to  which  it  is
presented and to which it is connected necessarily. The subject and its experience cannot
be removed as a component from an account of free will, as free will is fundamentally a
subjective matter. The subject, moreover being a subject, is part of what free will is and
free will is part of what being a subject is. Free will is essentially subjective in its nature.
What free will is can only be fully understood as it seems to subjects because free will is
necessarily a property of subjects. What free will is is what it seems to subjects  known
by characteristics  experienced  subjectively  as  marking  the  distinction  between  freely
willed choices and those that are not. We know almost invariably when we are thinking
or acting freely and when we are not   what characterises the experience of free will
when it occurs to us as subjects is free will, and what does not have those characteristics
is not free thought and action. Any satisfactory account must be given in terms of how it
seems to subjects. To attempt to give an entirely objective account of free will is thus
seriously misguided. 
To attempt a comprehensively objective account of free will would be like trying
to say what hearing G# played on the cello is like without reference to what it is like to
experience G# played on a cello. What it is like to hear G# played on the cello is what the
experience of G# played on the cello is. Of course there are objective things going on
when someone hears  G# played on the  cello;  but  from these  one  could  not  give  an
14 To use Gilbert Ryle’s analogy. (Ryle: 2015, pp.94-95)
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understanding of hearing G# played on the cello.15 Nor is an account of these objective
features required in order for it to be justifiably said that someone knows when they are
experiencing G#. Any good musician knows when he is experiencing G# as opposed to
F# with a good deal of reliability. Moreover, even if one does not know that it is G# one
is hearing, what it is to hear G# is what is involved in the experience of a certain sound
when  that  sound  is  that  of  G#.  Indeed,  imagine  how  yet  more  inadequate  and
misconceived an objective account  would be if  it  were of how the note sounds to a
particular person at a particular time, with their sensibilities  how it sounded to them 
which may be unique. What it is to know the taste of madeleine cake is what it is to taste
madeleine cake; and what it is for Proust’s narrator Marcel to know the taste of madeleine
cake is what it is for Proust’s narrator to taste madeleine cake. Moreover, Proust writes
three huge volumes about it.16
So, understanding clearly the phenomenology of free will and its importance  
free  will  for  the  subject   leads  us  to  see  another  way  in  which  the  traditionally
formulated problem of free will is misleading in the way that it sets up the problem and
what might be offered as a solution. Traditional attempts to give an entirely objective
description of free will cannot succeed, leading us to misunderstand what free will can be
and where indeed we should be looking for that understanding.
7.
The analysis here of a phenomenological understanding of free will should only be taken
as preliminary  but one hopes it is also seminal.17 There is a mistake at the outset that
this  account  avoids,  into  which  even  those  who  take  credence  of  the  findings  of  a
phenomenological investigation into free will seem consistently to fall. The mistake is to
present whatever one finds as the phenomenology of free will as evidence against the
objective  account   in  particular,  the  account  of  determinism.  But  this  approach  is
hopeless, as has been argued. Presented like that, whatever the phenomenology of free
will delivers may always be explained away as an illusion.18 The opposition is always
going to end up as appearance versus reality, with only one possible winner. It is worth
noting, however, that if one is going to discount free will as having any possibility of
some kind of veridicality when unsupported by an objective counterpart, then there is the
question  of  where  such  a  move  will  end.  If  the  issue  is  that  subjectivity  alone  is
insufficient as a justification, then all subjective experiences equally fall, as none of them
would remain standing as an account of how things really are in a complete, objective,
account of the universe. But this, as has been argued, is simply to deny that there are
15 There  is  a  large  and controversial  literature connected  to  this  kind of  claim,  in  particular,
(Nagel: 1974) and (Jackson: 1982). I make no attempt here to settle the argument, but rather claim only that
free will, and an understanding of it, should be a part of the argument.
16 (Proust, 1989, p. 48).
17 Indeed there is a perhaps surprising relative paucity of literature on the phenomenology of free
will. However, some recent examples are, (Horgan and Timmons: 2011); (Mueller: 2010); (Bayne, 2006).
Bayne says, ‘…a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-
person agency is beginning to emerge.’ (Bayne: 2006, p. 169).
18 And why not on this view? One already has a complete explanation of the universe without
allowing for free will. What this forgets is that there is the little matter of there being subjects, of being a
subject. Is that an illusion too?
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subjects at all   a bold and tricky step if you are one. The argument here avoids this
mistake by not starting down that road at all,  and it  does this by contending that the
objective  account  is  question-begging and necessarily so  in  ruling  out  as  it  does  the
conditions that make sense of free will at all, namely that there are subjects. Without this
move in the argument, the phenomenology of free will just becomes a one-sided battle
between what we strongly feel is true and what is shown objectively to be true. With this
move, an account of what free will is can be based on the phenomenology of free will.
8.
As a beginning, in the tentative steps towards a phenomenological understanding of free
will,  a certain structural feature is  worth pointing out.  Acts of free choice are poorly
understood if we take them in isolation. They are best understood in context. To judge
whether an act is freely chosen is to see it as fitting into the overall pattern of a person’s
life, and related to other acts. One may promise oneself that one will one day climb a
certain mountain.  It may take many years before the opportunity to do so arises, and
without knowing about the context of the decision, it may even seem a bizarre, unhinged
and irrational thing to want to do, and thus by some accounts an unfree act, especially if it
involves a risk to one’s life, as by some considerations one is perhaps now too old to
attempt it.  So there  needs  to  be subtlety and depth in  the understanding involved in
whether an act is freely chosen or not. But this is, in fact, just the kind of talk, forming
perhaps an unwitting analysis, that people engage in everyday life. No special training is
required  to  think  fruitfully  about  these  things  any  more  than  a  native  speaker  of  a
language needs special training to make himself understood.
What has been in the background, as the basis of the conception of free will here,
is what might be called the  hand-of-choice paradigm.  While considering what is said
about this, it would help if the reader made the effort to think what it is like when he or
she acts  freely,  to look at  it  from  his or her point of view as a subject.  Imagine the
following. One is in a CD shop and choosing a recording of Mahler’s 3 rd Symphony. One
puts out one’s hand and could from what is in front of one pick up and buy this or that
version of Mahler’s 3rd Symphony    Bernstein’s or Haitink’s. One’s hand is hovering
over  the two CD cases.  What  makes  it  a free choice,  and what  we all  understand it
phenomenologically to  be like when such a  choice is  made,  is  the presence in  one’s
thought that one may change one’s mind and choose differently right up to the very last
moment. One does not have to have a reason, let alone have it be rationally justified, for
the act to be one of free will; one may choose against reason,19 just to show that one can;
to show that at the last moment one can choose what one likes. The experienced quality
of doing this is the essence of free will.
It should be noted, to clear away a possible misunderstanding, that there is no
allusion here to the act being counter-causal. In fact, it may be noted that in the account
there is no reference to causality at all, nor need there be one.
Consider another example, in this case where one decides one is going, in the next
minute, to touch either one’s nose or one’s ear just for the sake of it; one’s hand hovers
19  To respond that this means one simply has another reason would render the connection 
between free will and reason an empty tautology.
15
around one’s face; at the last instant one chooses one or the other.20 Talking of acts, free
or otherwise, being determined by the dictates of reason seems utterly irrelevant here 
reason has nothing to do with it, as there is no rational justification available as to why
one acted one way rather than the other, as one literally chooses for no good reason.
Moreover, it might be said there is no good reason available as the act is utterly pointless.
Yet, it is palpably a free act, and definitively and overwhelmingly feels that way to us.
Indeed, it is how it feels, or how it is experienced, that in most cases identifies the act as
free. An account based on a lack of constraint fails to do justice to what occurs in either
the case of choosing the CD or touching the nose or ear  as both possible outcomes are
equally unconstrained and the lack of constraint cannot distinguish one choice as free as
opposed to the other one   what matters here to make the act free is something else:
simply  that  we  choose  one  rather  than  the  other.  The  choice  may  also  be  utterly
unpredictable, until the moment of choice, even to oneself, let alone to others. This is part
of its phenomenology. But it is not the unpredictability that makes the act a free one;
some free acts are predictable, some are not, in the sense of one’s chance of getting it
right  about  what  someone  will  do.  Again,  the  key  to  identifying  free  will  is  the
phenomenology.
Freedom, and what we value in it, is the capacity to be utterly capricious, whether
we exercise it or not. It is not capricious actions themselves that mark out actions as free,
but our capacity always to be capricious in any of our actions. The potential is always
there, whether we use it or not. To understand capriciousness one has to understand what
it involves from the stance of the subject, and the experienced phenomenon associated
with its occurrence  anything else will not do. It introduces into one’s life  the life of a
subject as it is lived  a kind of unregimented raw spontaneity, without which life would
be terribly dull indeed, indeed it would be barely tolerable. An unaccountableness. We
need not always exercise it. We may often do what is predictable, habitual, and perfectly
in accord with the rational choice; these acts may be free too, because we know that
something else stands beside them, namely the other choice we could have made if we
had wanted to. Without this capacity for caprice, we would not really be persons  there
would not be subjects at all.
We have no good reason for thinking that we do not have free will unless for the
same reason we are prepared to deny that there are - that we are - subjects, while as
subjects we have good reason for thinking that we do have free will. Few would or could
deny as subjects that there are subjects, nor should they. Therefore, we have good reason
for thinking that we have free will and no reason, or a reason we can accept only at a
huge and implausible cost, for thinking that we do not have free will. 
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